The unrelenting attack against Mr. Peter Obi’s presidential bid, underscores the endemic hatred against the Igbo in Nigeria. Some people have sworn that no Igbo person would be president of Nigeria. This is not withstanding the fact that Obi, in all ramifications, is the most outstanding candidate, with the required pedigree and unmatched track record. The only sin he has committed is that he is an Igbo man, This mimics what is happening in South Africa, where there is violent hatred against Nigerians and other African nationals. The question is why shoul
There isn’t one reason. The “hatred” is a mix of historical events, economic competition, political narratives, and stereotypes that reinforce each other.
Historically, the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), started after the January 1966 coup that killed Northern political leaders, which the Igbo were falsely accused of stage managing. . That was followed by the July 1966 counter-coup targeting Igbo officers, then mass killings of Igbo in the North. The war ended with about 3 million dead, mostly Igbo, from fighting and famine.
That trauma left deep distrust on all sides. For many non-Igbo, the war cemented an association of Igbo with “secession” and “disloyalty”. For many Igbo, it cemented a sense of marginalization and “we’re not wanted”. Official reports and state narratives since then have downplayed reconciliation, so the grievance persists.
Economically, Igbo are highly migratory and dominate trade/commerce in many Nigerian cities. In markets like Alaba, Ladipo, and Ariaria, Igbo traders are often the majority.
That creates three friction points, namely competition: Local traders see Igbo as taking over spaces and undercutting prices; visibility: When Igbo succeed commercially, it’s visible. When other groups do, it’s less concentrated; perception of insularity: Igbo business networks often prioritize other Igbo for credit and partnerships. That looks like exclusion to outsiders.
Data from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and market surveys show Igbo control a disproportionate share of Nigeria’s wholesale/retail trade. That’s not illegal, but it breeds resentment.
With regard to political representation,since 1999, no Igbo has been president or VP for a full term. Peter Obi’s 2023 campaign brought this to a head. During the election, “Igbo” became a proxy for “Obidients” online and in some media.
Hate speeches like “Igbo will dominate Lagos” or “Igbo are planning to take over” went viral, even though there’s no evidence of a coordinated plan. Politicians and influencers amplify this because ethnic fear mobilizes votes.
Common stereotypes like “Igbo are too aggressive/know-it-all” “They don’t integrate, they only stay among themselves” “They’re involved in fraud/drugs” Like all ethnic stereotypes, these are overgeneralizations. The “fraud” stereotype gets amplified because of the visibility of a small number of cases involving Igbo names, even though fraud cuts across all ethnic groups. EFCC data doesn’t break down convictions by ethnicity, so the perception runs on anec
Afrobarometer and NOIPolls surveys from 2020-2023 show that most Nigerians say they would not object to having a neighbor from another ethnic group. But trust in other ethnic groups as political leaders is low across the board, not just for Igbo. Online sentiment is harsher than offline behavior. Social media amplifies the loudest, most hostile voices.
Hate narratives exist about Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, and others too. “Hausa and Fulani are trying to Islamize Nigeria”, “Yoruba are betrayers”, etc. The Igbo case feels more visible because of Biafra, commerce, and the 2023 election.
When you combine a civil war memory, economic competition, political scapegoating and social media amplification, you get a persistent undercurrent of hostility. But it’s not uniform. In many cities Igbo and non-Igbo live, work, and intermarry without issue..
Example of Igbo hatred in Lagos during 2023 elections: Based on reports from the 2023 election period in Lagos,:there were threats and intimidation before the governorship election. MC Oluomo, then head of the Lagos Parks Management Committee, posted a video saying Igbos who wouldn’t vote APC should “stay at home”.
Ohanaeze and HURIWA said this was followed by attacks on Igbo voters on March 18, with reports of people being attacked with weapons and some hospitalized. “Eye test” incicidents said thugs at polling units used “eye tests” to identify people they believed were Igbo and prevented them from voting
Attacks on markets and property, market fires: Ohanaeze and other groups reported that shops and markets with high Igbo presence were vandalized and burnt after the February 25 presidential election.
Olowu Spare Parts Market, described as an Igbo-dominated market, was burnt down on March 9, 2023, a week before the governorship election. Lagos Police said some reports were fake news and that in one incident in Lagos Island, the market association had agreed to close shops, but some Igbo traders opened and hoodlums tried to enforce compliance.
Voter suppression at polling units: Vanguard and Frontiers research reported that in several polling units across Lagos, APC-aligned thugs blocked voters they believed were Igbo, attacked them, and destroyed ballots. International observers, including EU and other observer missions noted incidents of voter intimidation and violence in Lagos targeting specific ethnic groups.
Hate speech and online rhetoric such as the “IgboMustGo” slogan: This hashtag trended on X/Twitter during and after the elections, calling for Igbo to leave Lagos.
Statements by public figures :like Bayo Onanuga, then APC campaign spokesperson, was quoted making comments about Igbo “interfering in Lagos politics”. Femi Fani-Kayode also made statements that were widely criticized as inflammatory.
A 2024 Frontiers in Political Science study analyzed social media posts and found heavy use of “we vs them” rhetoric framing Igbo as a threat to Yoruba interes
Reacting, *Ohanaeze Ndigbo said they would petition Buhari and the National Assembly over “Igbo profiling” and set up an inquiry into killings and property destruction. South East NASS Caucus condemned what they called “dangerous ethnic profiling” and said it was reminiscent of pre-civil war events. The Lagos INEC REC denied allegations of ethnic cleansing calls. Police said they deployed officers to prevent attacks and that not all incidents were ethnic.
Lagos has a large Igbo population and is economically central, so it became a flashpoint because Peter Obi won Lagos in the presidential election with significant Igbo turnout. APC supporters said Igbo were trying to “take over Lagos politics”, while Igbo groups said they were just exercising voting rights.
The reports differ on scale and intent. Igbo groups and some media called it targeted ethnic violence. Police and some commentators said some incidents were criminality, market disputes, or fake news.
Reports from Kano during 2023 focused more on political thuggery between APC and NNPP supporters, voter inducement and irregularities. The “missing Kano children” case where some kids were allegedly taken to Anambra, fueled tension but wasn’t framed as a 2023 election issue against Igbo generally.
There was no verified incidents of attacks on Igbo in Kano during the 2023 elections were reported by police or major media. The viral bus attack story was debunked. Igbo were targeted in online posts nationally, including from Kano-based accounts, but that was online, not on the ground in Kano.
Difference is that In Lagos, there were multiple reports of voter intimidation, market attacks, and threats directed at Igbo. In Kano, the election violence was mostly intra-Hausa political clashes between APC and NNPP.
The way out of Igbo hatred in Nigeria has played out in other divided societies: reduce the incentives for ethnic scapegoating, and create enough shared stakes that attacking “them” starts to hurt “us” too.
Dr. Onyekakeyah, a former member of The Guardian Editorial Board, is a public affairs commentator and a Daily Query columnist.
