Excerpts from WHY WE STRUCK by Major Adewale Ademoyega; an active participant’s account by one of the prime movers of the military coup
Now, there were more Road Blocks–all loyal to Ironsi and with orders to arrest “unfriendly forces.” Who, in fact were unfriendly forces? There was no clear definition. News soon reached us that some of our officers had been arrested. So, what was our immediate mission? This was quite clear to us. To get Ironsi. But now that we were in Lagos, where exactly was Ironsi? Some said Ikeja, and some said he had passed through Apapa. Yet others said that he had returned to Ikoyi. We made straight for Ikoyi, while the younger officers in the cars were sent around to bring us.
Soon, we were in Ikoyi. I observed that the NBC was now occupied in bigger strength. I approached the gate and was told that a certain broadcast had been made in the morning and that since then, nobody had been allowed to go in. The GOC was not around either.
A little further away, there were new troops at the entrance to the Officers Mess. The troops had Orders not to allow anybody to go in. But again, the GOC was not there and had not been seen around. Once more, I conferred with Anuforo. We considered the effect of shooting our way into NBC to make a broadcast to the nation that the Army had over. This would immediately bring about an open clash between us and the reactionary forces of Ironsi
The only objection to this was that we did not have revolutionary troops with us and it would, therefore, be unwise to start an open fight. On the other hand, we could not contact Kaduna or Enugu since we had no access to Army signals network, and the public telephones had been disrupted. We decided at once to leave Lagos for Ironsi. It was quicker to make Enugu than Kaduna from Lagos. As such, we decided to drive to Enugu in the ferrets, so that if our own troops had been successfully there, we could contact Kaduna.
Now, it was already midday. Ironsi was not yet located but it was known that he had summoned troops from Ibadan. No news about Enugu, and no news about Kaduna. The young officers who were formerly with us were now flung afield. Some still fished for news for us. Some were back in their units and others had already been arrested by troops loyal to Ironsi. Most of what we knew were heard by interrogating the troops around NBC and Federal Guards Officers’ Mess. They freely answered our questions, assuming that we were on Ironsi’s side because we simply sat on our ferrets as if newly summoned from another station.
Nevertheless, those troops held their ground firmly. If we tried to enter into any of the positions or into any military barracks whatever, we would have had to shoot our way in. The situation had become highly explosive. Any move that was contrary to the orders of Ironsi would have sparked off a bloody fight.
At this juncture, I led the troop of only four ferrets and we drove from Ikoyi through Ebute Metta and Ikorodu Road. After the Maryland junction, there was a heavy road block. Again, as if we were troops summoned by Ironsi, we were allowed to pass and we drove towards Ikorodu.
Soon after passing the Majidun Bridge we met troops of the 4th Battalion from Ibadan in Land Rovers and 3–tonners, driving towards Lagos. I checked my time, it was a quarter past one in the afternoon. I recalled that about fourteen hours before, five majors were gathered to start this action. Now only two of us were together. The remainder had vanished from our sight since half-past three in the night, that is to say, only four hours after we started and only one and half hours since the H–Hour, when action actually began. We had lost Ifeajuna and Okafor, both of whom were only sources of troops, weapons, communication and confidence.
If we did not have those two in the first place (in view of the strategic posts that they were holding),we would not have started at all. Now we were left in the lurch. Chukwuka ,too, had not joined up with us and Obienu did not report with his troops. We had lost valuable time seeking for those things that should have been made available to us and which we previously believed were available to us. We had lost troops, ground and time. Now we have also lost Lagos to Ironsi. What a terrible situation!
