By Sami Abdelhalim Saeed
On September 12, 2025, the Quad—comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States—released a joint statement proposing a path to end the conflict in Sudan.
The statement highlights that the war has triggered the world’s worst humanitarian crisis and poses grave risks to regional peace and security. The Quad ministers called for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to facilitate the swift entry of humanitarian aid, which should then lead to a permanent ceasefire and an inclusive transition process.
Earlier, in May 2023, the United States and Saudi Arabia facilitated lengthy negotiations between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), resulting in the signing of the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan. Both the Jeddah Declaration and the Quad proposal share the fundamental goals of ending the conflict in Sudan, protecting civilians, and facilitating humanitarian aid. However, there are significant differences in their scope, approach, and the political contexts in which they were created.
Shared Foundations and Core Similarities Between the Initiatives
1. Humanitarian Focus: Both initiatives prioritise addressing the humanitarian crisis. They call for the protection of civilians, ensuring safe passage, and providing unhindered access for humanitarian assistance.
2. Adherence to International Law: Both documents explicitly reference the obligations of the warring parties under International Humanitarian Law. The Quad proposal even refers to the commitments made in the Jeddah Declaration, indicating continuity of purpose.
3. Rejection of a Military Solution: Both statements agree that the conflict cannot be resolved through military means and that a political solution is the only viable path forward.
4. Civilian-Led Governance: Both initiatives emphasise the importance of a future Sudanese government being led by civilians. They assert that the Sudanese people, not the warring parties, should determine their country’s future.
5. External Mediation: Both documents are products of external diplomatic efforts. The Jeddah Declaration was facilitated by Saudi Arabia and the United States, while the Quad proposal involves a broader coalition of regional and international powers (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the U.S.).
Key Differences in Scope and Approach
1. Scope and Detail: The Jeddah Declaration is a “Declaration of Commitment” focused on specific, on-the-ground rules of conduct for the warring parties regarding civilians and humanitarian aid. It serves as a humanitarian and short-term ceasefire framework. In contrast, the Quad proposal is a more comprehensive political roadmap, addressing humanitarian issues and outlining a detailed timeline for a political transition, including a three-month humanitarian truce followed by a nine-month transition to civilian rule.
2. Actors Involved: This is a crucial distinction. The Jeddah Declaration was a direct agreement signed by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The Quad proposal is a joint statement from a group of concerned nations, not a direct agreement between the warring parties.
This fundamental difference between the two initiatives poses a challenge for the Quartet. The Quad must find a way to persuade the two parties to come to the negotiating table and agree to a ceasefire. This challenge tests the Quad countries’ influence over both parties, as well as the strength and cohesion of the Quad alliance. It is essential to consider the Jeddah Declaration as part of the negotiating framework, as it represents the foundations of the ceasefire and was previously signed by the parties under the auspices of Saudi Arabia and the United States.
3. Rejection of Specific Groups: The Quad proposal goes further by explicitly rejecting any role for “violent extremist groups that are part of or evidently linked to the Muslim Brotherhood” in Sudan’s political future. This political dimension was not expressly stated in the initial Jeddah Declaration.
After more than two years of war, the role of extremist and violent groups has become prominent. Social media has begun documenting these groups’ activities and the crimes they commit. Due to their danger and escalating influence, the U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned some of these groups, describing them as threats to regional stability.
4. External Military Support: The Quad proposal specifically calls for an end to external military support for the combatants, acknowledging a key factor that has prolonged the war. The Jeddah Declaration, while focused on the actions of the SAF and RSF, did not explicitly address the role of foreign powers in supplying them.
An Uphill Battle: Challenges Facing the Quad Proposal
Despite its comprehensive nature, the Quad proposal faces several significant challenges, primarily stemming from its identity as a high-level diplomatic plan rather than a signed agreement.
1. Lack of Buy-in from Warring Parties: The most immediate challenge is the lack of direct commitment from the SAF and RSF. The Sudanese government, aligned with the SAF, has already rejected the proposal, opposing the idea of being excluded from a post-war transition. They argue that only the Sudanese people, led by existing institutions, should determine their future. Both the SAF and the RSF are still pursuing a military victory, making them unlikely to agree to a political process that would marginalise them. The SAF has repeatedly refused direct negotiations with the RSF, a stance observers attribute to the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood within key military institutions that insist on being part of the future political equation.
2. Failure of Past Agreements: The Jeddah Declaration itself, despite being a signed commitment, was repeatedly violated. This history of non-compliance raises doubts about whether the warring parties will honour a new proposal, especially one perceived as being imposed from the outside. Members of the former National Congress Party and Islamists within the military fear any future changes that might lead to accountability for past crimes and corruption. This fear also exists within the RSF leadership, which has committed widespread violations of the rules of war.
3. External Influence and Proxy Conflicts: The proposal’s call to end external military support highlights a significant challenge. The conflict is fueled by foreign powers providing arms and funding to both sides. Convincing these external actors to cease their support will be a considerable diplomatic hurdle, complicated by the fact that some Quad members have themselves been accused of taking sides.
4. Internal Divisions within Sudan: The proposal calls for an “inclusive and transparent transition process.” However, unifying Sudan’s diverse political and civil society groups is a monumental task. The conflict has deepened existing political, ethnic, and regional divisions, with numerous factions holding competing visions for the country’s future.
5. Ambitious Timeline and Weak Enforcement: The proposed timeline—a three-month truce followed by a nine-month transition—is highly ambitious given the ongoing hostilities. Without a robust and effective enforcement mechanism, this timeline risks being disregarded, as have previous ceasefire attempts. The Quad’s ability to “exercise their good offices” and “discuss further steps” may be insufficient to compel compliance.
Regardless of the challenges, the Quad Initiative represents a significant international and regional consensus to put an end to the devastating war that has been ongoing in Sudan since 2023, during which thousands of people have died, and the country’s infrastructure has been devastated beyond precedent in any other war. The initiative emerged after the world had remained silent on the war in Sudan for so long that the Sudanese felt abandoned to death, destruction, and genocide. If it succeeds in engaging all influential actors in the Sudanese political scene and exerts pressure on the warring parties, this initiative could achieve many milestones in favour of peace.
Dr. Saeed PhD, a Sudanese constitutional lawyer, is the Vice President of the African Network of Constitutional Lawyers (ANCL), based in Cape Town, South Africa. He can be reached at advosami@gmail.com.
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