ON October 24, 2000, IBB, in a Voice of Nigeria (VON) Hausa service interview, said “Only Gani Fawehinmi and Colonel Dangiwa Umar are the only true, principled fighters of June 12. Others are sycophants who fed fat on June 12”.
My relationship with General Babangida
“I had on several occasions in the past explained why I enjoy a very close relationship with IBB. IBB was my instructor at the Nigerian Defence Academy. Since then, I found him to be a very brilliant and inspiring officer. In fact, he had great influence on my career choice of the armoured corps, being an amour officer himself. Of course, we had disagreements, some of them quite straining, but they have not succeeded m changing my perception of him. This is true with most officers who worked closely with the man. With all this, I had never allowed such a close personal relationship to becloud my vision and judgment of his performance as a superior officer, particularly during his eight-year rule as President and C-in-C. Mr. Edwin Madunagu, a man I have high regards for as an accomplished intellectual and a socially concerned person, confirmed what I have always suspected that most outsiders believe I am too fanatically loyal to IBB to the extent that I failed to attribute any fault to him even in the June 12 saga. This definitely ignores my decision, to demonstrate open dissent to the annulment by writing a letter to the President resigning my hard-earned Commission, a letter that was mischievously leaked to the press.
The truth however is that such strident opposition to IBB’s faltering steps was a remarkable and consistent feature of that fanatical loyalty. I must confess that were it not for IBB’s magnanimity and unusual patience with dissenters, or opposition parties as we were jokingly called, I would have been kicked out of service a few months after he took over. Some senior officers, including the late Gen. Sani Abacha and Gen. Dongoyaro, queried my continued retention in service even though to them, I constituted a grave threat to the regime by what they regarded as my anti-regime activities.
Not many Nigerians are aware that I escaped execution or jail by the whiskers during the Mamman Vasta coup trials. The evidence used to cause my interrogation came from some senior officers who later confessed that they found me too confrontational and rude to be left in service. I was set free when no evidence of my involvement could be established. Later events changed the minds of some of these officers but the point here is that IBB appreciated officers who possessed high moral courage and could deploy reason to influence his decisions.
The IBB boys that many want to denigrate were some of the best and brightest in the service. IBB encouraged the culture of dissent and dialogue and this is why some of us became emboldened to speak out when we disagreed with him.
Sometimes we won and many other times, he taught us that junior officers could have their say, but Generals decided on the course of action. Readers will also be surprised to learn that IBB had no respect for sycophants.
The June 12 crisis and events leading to it are evidence enough to buttress the above points. My loyalty to IBB which people allude to, did not prevent me from vehemently disagreeing with and opposing him when he was being misguided by sinister forces to take decisions that were injurious to good governance and inimical to the existence and unity of this country. I had in the past resisted all temptations to recount these sad events. In fact, I rejected a very lucrative book contract simply to avoid any attempt at what may appear as self-glorification and causing injury to some of my colleagues. It must be made clear that I didn’t contribute more to the democratic struggle than most of them, the factthatIbecomemore prominentcouldbearesultofmyvery good relationship with the Nigerian press which I certainly identified as a most veritable weapon for such struggle and used so effectively. It must also be remembered that I was the first military casualty of that struggle and that I persevered to the end.
The fact that I belong, by birth to a group which was perceived by that press to be the major beneficiary of the continued military rule which the pro-democracy groups were fighting, added poignancy to my participation in that struggle.
The Descent Into The Abyss
For the records, my pro-democracy activism started well before the June 12 crisis. When towards the end of 1992, I came to the painfulrealizationthatGen.Babangida wasbeingill-advisedto once again postpone the transition to civil rule, I decided, in consultation with some of my colleagues, to advise him to save Nigeria from an unnecessary political crisis. The letter part- reproduced below was part of the efforts at getting him to fulfill his promise of handing other power to an elected government. In that letter which was written October 1992, I had said inter alia: “Mr. President, it truly pains me any time 1 read in the newspapers and magazines speculations on your sincerity in handing over in January 1993 as the Transition Programme provides. I am pained because of the implied questioning of your integrity….. I beg you to resist any temptation from any quarters whatsoever to become another Mobutu or Eyadema. You have bidden official farewell to both the OAU and ECOWAS and I can tell you that I was personally proud of that action… I stand to share, no matter how infinitesimally in any encomiums that history may pour on you. I equally stand condemned if history judges you otherwise… About all my suggestions, in the name of Allah, I beg you, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, to leave this stage while the ovation is loudest.”
I spoke to most of IBB’s close associates to help dissuade him from any further delays. Gen. Sani Abacha was one such people. The general assured me that he would do everything possible to
prevail on IBB to complete the transition by the end of 1992. He told me how worried he was that the military was fast losing credibility on account of the glaring insincerity in the implementation of the Transition Programme. He appealed to me to try and assist in sensitizing officers, particularly of the armoured corps, to realize that not all of us were in support of the delays in the programme. He confessed that he was already in touch with other officers who were equally concerned.
With hindsight, I may be accused of naivety but one needed the gift of clairvoyance to correctly appreciate Gen. Abacha’s dubious designs. The general’s leadership limitations were all too glaring and who would have thought that he could harbour the desire to take over political control of the country at its most turbulent period? The nation was united in its opposition to any further delay in the military’s handover to a democratically elected government and the international community had taken a firm stand against military regimes. How then could a general of Abacha’s calibre hope to command the loyalty of Nigerians and gain the support of the international community, especially since he was such a key player in the IBB regime?
I convinced myself that we could use Abacha to achieve our aim. I brought in more officers, including those that would only grudgingly pay compliments to the general as their military duty. Col. Sambo Dasuki was one of such officers who kept asking me whether I was sure that Abacha was truly the nationalist I wanted to convince him he was. I pleaded with him to come along. The group enlarged so fast. We decided to meet weekly to review the situation. Gen. Abacha served as a kind of Trojan horse in government. He reported back on his many dialogues with IBB and some officers who he claimed were against a transfer of power under the prevailing political crisis and our low economic state. He kept painting a hopeless situation in which IBB had become impervious and incorrigible, a hostage of a clique.
It was not difficult for most members of the group to believe him because the Transition Programme, which had originally been meant to terminate in 1990, continued to suffer further setbacks. The primaries of the political parties were cancelled on the pretext that they were plagued by malpractices. Reforms that saw the adoption of the Option A4 formula were carried out. All these added to their skepticism.
I decided to meet IBB directly to find out the true situation. I came out with a different picture. He assured me that for real, he would keep faith with the handover. Any changes to the transition programme were only necessary measures that would guarantee the survivability of democracy. I gave him further indications of his constituency’s growing distrust and restiveness, such that no one could guarantee the support of the entire military in the event of civil uprising, which was imminent.
I felt free to warn IBB of the possibility of a military coup if he decided on self-succession as some of his senior officers were speculating. Being the commandant of the armoured corps and a truly loyal subordinate, I had no doubt that my observations had significant impact on the President and perhaps contributed to his decision to step aside as some convenient exit point.
Having said this, I was under no illusion, that a coup against IBB would be an easy task, not with his sophisticated security network, which was reinvigorated after its embarrassing failure to detect Orkar’s attempted coup. I believe it is his sense of total control of the military that informed his often- quoted statement that he dominates his environment. Also he operated one of the most generous welfare programmes the military ever had. All the same, self-succession was not on the cards, he assured me. I left him more confused. What I heard was in sharp contrast with Abacha’s conclusion. My attitude was to give IBB a chance but at the same time, keep in touch with the Abacha group.
The SDP and NRC primaries were held, with MKO Abiola and Bashir Tofa emerging as their respective presidential candidates. Although security reports scored them as worse than the previous party primaries in the manner of their fraudulent conduct, the government expressed satisfaction with then conduct.
In fact, IBB endorsed the emergence of the two flag bearers when he opined that the nation could not hope for better presidential candidates. I did not share these sentiments but I was satisfied that the transition was making progress. In our subsequent meetings with Abacha, I drew attention to the positive development and urged him to sustain the momentum. He expressed pessimism. I will now fast forward to June 1993.
A few days to the 12 June presidential elections, Justice Bassey Ikpeme (now late) of the Federal High Court, Abuja, granted the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) a previously unknown political pressure group, an injunction stopping NEC from going ahead with the conduct of the elections.
I met the President and pleaded with him to set aside the court ruling on the strength of an existing law that ousted the powers of all courts to interfere with NEC’s conduct of elections and also because of its cataclysmic potential. He agreed and immediately summoned NEC chairman, Prof. Humphrey Nwosu and asked him to go ahead with preparations for the election.
Before I left Aso Rock, I met Brig. Gen. Akilu who told me that the President had just briefed him on my position which he supported. He added that the nation was fast losing faith and that we should support IBB to hand over and leave a good legacy like Gen. Obasanjo had done in 1979. I thanked him.
On my way out, I met a group of officers, including Gen. Abacha, making their way to the President’s office. I was later told that their mission was to urge IBB to respect the court’s ruling, their reason being that neither Abiola nor Bashir Tofa was acceptable to the military.
Furthermore, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) had not started yielding the much expected dividends and civilians could not muster the political pluck to sustain it. I really didn’t know whether Abacha shared these views or was simply carrying the message of a group which he felt was politically influential in the scheme of things. Whatever the truth was, I became skeptical of Abacha’s sincerity.
The presidential elections were held on June 12 as scheduled. They were adjudged as the freest and fairest by both NEC and local and international observers. I phoned the President from Bauchi to congratulate him on the peaceful election. He sounded relieved. Results started trickling in and from all indications, MKO Abiola was leading by a wide margin and one could safely conclude, an unbridgeable margin.
But then, rumours started flying that NEC was after all, not satisfied with the conduct and was about to recommend total cancellation to the government.
About one week later, I met Mr. President and confronted him with the rumours. He denied but added that NEC was still in the process of collating the results, which would be announced in due course. I went back to Bauchi , satisfied that all was well.
We had earlier discussed with Baba Gana Kingibe, who was Abiola’s running mate, against the wish of IBB according to him. He told me that the president expressed misgivings about a Moslem-Moslem ticket but had to let go when Abiola assured him that he would have no problem with the Christian community.
Baba Gana visited me on my return to Bauchi. He was agitated. He was as usual very blunt when he warned that they had information about government’s plan to annul the June 12 election results. He added that should that happen, Abiola would fight the annulment. I assured him that no such thing would happen. I told him that I was in touch with IBB who assured me that there was no truth in the wicked rumours.
He left, definitely feeling reassured. I got the impression that Baba Gana was more concerned about the dire consequences of an annulment to national stability than losing an opportunity to serve as the Vice- President.
A couple of days later, I was summoned to Aso Rock by Mr. President. He was presiding at a meeting of the National Defence and Security Council when I arrived. He came out on break around 1pm and called me to his office. Looking tired and angry, he said to me, “I am really fed up with all this. I am going to quit this thankless job and allow you guys to find a solution to your problems” or words to that affect. I expressed surprise. He then told me about the security reports he received to the effect that the military was against the election results and that some middle- ranking officers had vowed to topple the new government as soon as he handed over. Some senior officers had become apprehensive of the decision to hand over immediately.
I was shocked by this revelation and assured IBB that such reports were baseless. They were the creation of senior officers who did not want to retire from service. I told him that my reading of the situation was that Abiola did very well in the barracks and most officers I spoke to expressed satisfaction with the results received so far and were happy that the military was after all relinquishing power. He looked unsure.
Well, I beseeched the President not to even contemplate annulment. It was already evident that Abiola had emerged the winner after the results of 29 states were already known to NEC. Abiola’s win was an added bonus because it would achieve the much desired power shift to the south. He agreed. Before taking my leave, I informed the President that I planned to retire from service as soon as he found any need to annul the June 12 election. I also informed him that some newspapers had that morning mischievously and falsely identified me as the leader of a group
that met and recommended that the President should annul the result of the election. He was very sympathetic. I took leave.
On my way to the ADC’s office, I met the Chief Press Secretary, Chief Duro Onabule. Knowing how very close he was to the President, I pleaded with him to encourage the general to accept the results of the elections. He promised to do that. At the office of the ADC, I met the NEC chairman who was looking rattled. I took Prof. Nwosu aside and said to him. Mr. Chairman, I know you are a good Christian, I beg you in the name of the good Lord to follow the path of honour and justice by doing what is right; any misstep on your part could spell doom for the very existence of Nigeria. He assured me that he was conscious of that and would abide by his oath.
I left for Bauchi a very dejected and troubled man . I could not fight the thoughts of what terrible fate would befall Nigeria if annulment occurred. Why would officers, some of who had fought in the war to keep Nigeria one, push the nation to the brink? What sort of ambition could cause officers who by virtue of their commission had sworn to defend the territorial integrity of the country and aid in the maintenance of law and order, to deliberately plunge the nation into avoidable chaos? Why was it difficult for brilliant and experienced administrators identify this easy way out of our crisis as the election of Abiola provided? This was God’s grace, I reasoned. Why then should anybody reject it?
But again, I recalled the rebuke of one senior officer who once admonished me not to insist that my views or ways were the only solution to problems. So perhaps I should use his counsel in my assessment of the situation. But at the end of this introspection, I made up my mind to quit the service if the election results were annulled. What preoccupied my mind in the rest of the journey to Bauchi was my fate in retirement. Fear of the unknown gripped me and I prayed.
On 23 June at around 10am, an officer rushed into my office and inquired if I had heard the latest news, I asked what it was and he informed me that the BBC had just announced the annulment of the June 12 presidential election. I was shocked and immediately called the office of the president. I spoke to the Principal General Staff Officer (PGSO) who confirmed the news. The president was away in Katsina to attend the burial of General Yar’Adua’s father who passed away that morning. I summoned my Staff Officers to a meeting at which I informed them of my decision to apply for voluntary retirement from service.
Soon after, I dispatched my letter to theOffice of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), I also copied the Military Secretary. I honestly don’t know how my letter got to the print media, which published a copy of it.
On hearing about the letter, some officers including some of those I had taken into confidence on my plan, rushed to the president and pleaded with him to court martial me. I was told later that a decision was reached to simply accept my letter and allow me to go quietly. The COAS, Gen. Salihu Ibrahim summoned me to Lagos and expressed regret that events had turned out this way and felt sorry that I decided to go on retirement. He also regretted the leakage of my paper to the press. He informed me that the president had been persuaded to accept my application but would want to see me immediately.
Gen Salihu had been my first commanding Officer. He was a thoroughly professional officer who came through many travails to deservedly rise to the enviable post of COAS against many odds. This is a topic for another day. We reviewed the situation at length. I left for Abuja the next day to meet with IBB as instructed. I was ushered into the president’s office by the ADC. I met Gen. Tanko Ayuba who was on his way out. I had hardly sat down when IBB
received a call from Gen Salihu.
They spent about five minutes and when he was through, he turned to me and asked why I had decided to put in my letter which was leaked to the press without informing him first. I apologized immediately and denied being responsible for the leakage. We reviewed the political situation and I finally told him that I was convinced that it was in my interest to retire. He disagreed and ordered me to return to my station and remain quiet.
Generals Tanko Ayuba, Salihu and God knows who else, pleaded on my behalf but most importantly, I believe IBB genuinely appreciated the struggle of some of us. I still don’t believe that if he decided to send me to jail, heavens would have fallen. Perhaps a one-paragraph explanation if the need ever arose, would have settled my case and consigned me to the list of dismissed officers. That he didn’t do that is evidence of his magnanimity.
I returned to Bauchi convinced of the need for the military to resist this annulment, which was said to have been done on our behalf. I was torn between two loyalties while considering what could be done.
One was my loyalty to IBB, which had just been reinforced by his show of sympathy and kindness in refusing to accept my application for voluntary retirement. The other was my loyalty to the nation. Gen Abacha aided me in reaching the decision to consider easing out IBB through a military coup.
This was how it happened.
Two days after my meeting with IBB, I got a call from Col. Yakubu Muazu who asked me to meet Gen. Abacha at his residence in Kano the next day. I met Abacha around 9pm on a Saturday. The General went direct to business. He told me of the efforts of his group to stop the annulment of the election but they failed. But that could not be allowed to stand in view of its far reaching ramifications to the unity and stability of the country. He also told me of some security reports which revealed a plan by some Yoruba organizations which were plotting to declare an Oduduwa
Republic. These groups, he said, enjoyed the support of some officersofsouthern extraction.He mentioned some names,which included some so-called IBB boys.
The General waxed nationalistic but I was not deceived. I had since begun to suspect Gen. Abacha’s sincerity and motives and I was not certain that he indeed believed he could come to power through a coup against IBB. Yes, with the prevailing political situation against the annulment, it was not difficult to imagine mass support of a coup by officers, but it was inconceivable that many officers would stake their lives in order to replace IBB with Gen. Sani Abacha as Head of State. That was my reading but people are entitled to their opinion, so why did I agree as I did to join Abacha in a coup against IBB?
Firstly, Gen. Abacha swore in the name of God that he had no other motive but to restore the mandate of MKO Abiola. Secondly, for the coup to be bloodless, the GOCs had to be out of station. I figured that Gen. Abacha could at any time call them to Lagos for consultations. Let me say this, I have no evidence to believe that any of the GOCs supported the annulment. In fact, I still believe that the fatal decision was taken by some members of the NDSC, of course supported by other officers and perhaps civilians. But the truth is that none of the GOCs was part of our group, so we could not count on their support. Thirdly, Abacha could give us extra cover.
I must however confess that I perceived a situation where we would jettison Abacha at some point. Already a few members of the former group had expressed misgivings about his motives. But, most importantly, Abacha had his Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) staff all over some of us. He paid attention. There was no move that any member of our group could make without him knowing. We therefore settled for a coup. He fixed our next meeting for Friday, six days away. He asked me to get our reconnaissance units ready. As promised, I readied at least the key areas i.e. Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna, Jos and Enugu. The group held a two-day meeting in Lagos as scheduled. I briefed them on the level of readiness of our troops, I took the opportunity of my staying to visit the facilities of 245 Reconnaissance Battalion whose CO, retired Colonel Jibrin Isa, was fully committed to the scheme.
I also had the opportunity to bring on board, the 9 Bde commander, retired Gen. Patrick Aziza. At the end of our consultations, we agreed on a plan and fixed 11 July 93 as the D-day.
The plan was simply to have Gen. Abacha summon the GOCs and the commanders of support arms and services to Lagos for a briefing on the political crisis occasioned by the June 12 elections annulment. We figured that security would not raise any eyebrows since Abacha had shown enough support for the annulment by his high-handed suppression of the June 12 annulment protests in Lagos.
Once at the venue, the General would reveal to them the decision of the Armed Forces to the effect that Prof. Nwosu was to formally announce the results and as we had already known, Abiola would be sworn in. The election tribunal already in place would entertain any petitions from aggrieved parties. I would make the first coup broadcast and General Abacha would follow later.
A team of senior officers headed by Gen. Useni, who was not involved in our plot was to go to Abuja and break the news to IBB. On Sunday, I left Lagos for Ibadan to ascertain 242 Reconnaissance Battalion state of readiness. The CO, retired Col. M.S Shehu, a fine officer, was fully ready. I drove back to Bauchi through Jos on Monday.
On Friday 2 July, I left for Lagos.
I held meetings with some officers, including Col Jaafaru Isa, Dauda Komo etc., they .showed great enthusiasm for the project as they believed like many other officers that it was an honourable task. We also met with Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe at No 7 Raymond Njoku Road Ikoyi later that day. Baba Gana was monitoring some of our activities since Abiola was out of the country.
On Saturday 10 July, 1 had a meeting with Gen. Abacha around midday. He informed me that he was in touch with MKO and he assured him that things were moving according to plan. He was also in touch with Kingibe, he had already summoned all the GOCs to Lagos and didn’t anticipate any problems. The Sunday meeting was going to hold at his guest house. He and Gen. Diya were also coming to the final coordinating meeting at 9pm at Gen. David Mark’s guest house in Park View, Ikoyi, he said. He asked if the units were ready and I confirmed so.
Again I met Generals Bamaiyi, Onoja and Ahmed Abdullahi waiting as I left Abacha in his inner sitting room. Only Abdullahi was part of our group.Around 8.45pm, I arrived Gen. Mark’s guest house, in company of Col. Sambo. We met Gwadabe, David Mark and a few others. Abacha, Diya and Abdullahi did not turn up. Instead, David Mark presided.
We went over the plan. As the meeting progressed, one of the officers asked me what appointment I was interested in, in the government that was to be formed. I was shocked at this. When I asked which government, he told me that Gen. Abacha had pleaded that he be allowed to take over as Head of State! He would stay for about 6 months to help purge the military and judiciary before handing over to Abiola. As can be imagined, I was so disgusted as were some of the officers present. I immediately asked the chairman, to allow us to go on recess and reconvene around l am. To which he agreed.
I dashed to Gen. Diya’s house at Alexander Avenue. He was all alone. I asked why he was not at the meeting and he just looked blank. Inquired from him if he knew of Abacha’s request and he said to me, “Dangiwa I know you are sincere but I am afraid Gen. Abacha has a hidden agenda.” And what did he think of the request? He said he thought it would not work. I then told him that I was going to see Gen. Abacha and he should also meet with him later to assure him that most of the officers involved would not accept this new plan. I left him a very worried and evidently confused person.
I met Gen. Abacha around 11pm. He asked if the meeting was over and I told him that we had to break because of the new development. He pretended not to know what I was talking about. When I narrated the message the officer passed on to us, I could read the embarrassment written all over his face. He tried to convince me that it was the opinion of some of the officers who thought that Abiola’s government would face serious challenges from the military and judiciary and that it would be very risky to leave him at their mercy.
The officers according to him were also apprehensive of their own survival in the event that Abiola’s government got toppled, which according to credible security reports, was very likely. He pleaded with me to show flexibility. I was incredulous, horrified you could say.
I disagreed outright with his submission and warned him of the terrible consequences of this course of action.
I had on all the occasions of our meetings reminded the group that Nigerians would not accept this annulment and were bound to oppose it vehemently. There had been riots earlier and what we were experiencing was a prelude to very violent uprising particularly in the South West.
The international community had condemned the annulment and was planning to impose sanctions. I reminded Abacha of all those and pleaded with him to save Nigeria from collapse. I finally apprised him of the difficulties he would face from members of the armed forces who would rather have Abiola as C-in-C than he. This last observation may not have gone down well with him when he attempted to blackmail me.
He pointed out that it was already belated and that we had gone so far in the coup plot that if we were to postpone it or call it off, there would be leakage and IBB would round us up. I agreed with him and pleaded with him one more time to stand on the side of truth and justice by sticking to the original plan, which envisaged a hand over to Abiola.
Blind ambition for power without purpose or with the wrong purpose had gripped Abacha. He was unyielding. With this, I shocked him with the news that I was out of the plot. He asked how and I informed him that I was on my way to tell the COs to stand down. I left and headed to the Lagoon Restaurant where I had earlier ordered for take-away snacks, envisaging that I was going to be late.
Right behind me when I arrived at the Lagoon was Gen. Ahmed Abdullahi. I was not expecting him, so I thought he was on a mission to arrest me. I paid the usual compliments to a senior officer and asked what his mission was. He said he was late for the meeting but was informed of what had transpired and expressed his regrets that the original plan was altered. I praised him for his moral courage and assured him that I was on my way to Ikeja to abort the plot. He left. I collected my snacks and made my way to 245 Reconnaissance Battalion. I met the CO in his office. I briefed him on the unfortunate development.
He was also shocked and agreed that we should not attempt anything against IBB government unless it was to reverse the annulment. We got in touch with the other officers who were waiting for instructions and asked them to stand down. Once this was sorted out, I asked Col. Isa to go and inform the group that we had decided to quit on account of change of the plan by Gen. Abacha. The plan was therefore aborted.
I am not sure but I cannot rule out the possibility that IBB picked some signals of our move. I am not sure if that contributed to his decision to announce the creation of an Interim National Government (ING) on 31 July 1993 to be headed by Chief Earnest
Shonekan. In that announcement, he indicated his plan to step aside on 27 August, 1993, the day the new government would be inaugurated. That decision had a calming effect on the resolve of those Nigerians who were sworn to contest the June 12 annulment even if it meant setting the country ablaze. But it was a case of suspended animation. It was evident that this group would not accept the ING as a legitimate alternative. I believe that the creation of that government was a step in the wrong direction.
My hope was for NDSC to realize its mistake in the annulment, which had effectively pushed Nigeria to the precipice. But positions had unfortunately hardened. We found ourselves dealing with Generals who were more concerned about winning the war of nerves with the growing opposition. The ING solution was the only face saving concession they could make. De-annulment was tantamount to accepting defeat. The government had pledged never to accept being chased out of power whenever it was challenged for causing time-buying delays in the prosecution of its transition programme. The ING was doomed from conception. It was bound to fail.
Just before IBB announced his decision to step aside, Gen. Abacha made one more attempt to overthrow his regime. Unknown to some of us, he had created another group and recruited some of our members. It was, however, difficult for him to execute his coup undetected by us. I don’t believe Abacha contacted any of the GOCs in his latest plot. The reconnaissance units had been stood down but their COs were instructed to await further instructions as regards a new date. General Abdulsalami and I were to leave for the quarterly inspection visit to Newcastle, England to assess the progress being made by Vickers, which was manufacturing main battle tanks for the Nigerian Army.
I had earlier requested that my deputy should substitute me for this trip but Gen. Abacha detected this and insisted that I should go.
Gen. Abdulsami, Brig. Gen. Garba Abdulkardir, Mr. Onoja (a director at the Ministry of Defence) and I were at the airport for the check-in when word came that government had decided to cancel the trip, in its reaction to the sanctions imposed on Nigeria by the British government on account of the annulment of the June 12 election.
I returned to the Bauchi State Liaison office in Victoria Island around 8.30pm on that Saturday night, 24 July 1993. Barely 30 minutes later, CO 245 Reconnaissance Battalion, Col. Isa arrived. His mission was to confirm the latest instruction from Gen. Abacha, In a nutshell, his unit was instructed to participate in a coup that was to take place the next morning 25 July. He was told that I had left for the UK but that I was aware of the operation. He was there to confirm that I had indeed left as my flight was scheduled to depart at midnight. I denied any knowledge of the plan. I asked him to disregard the instructions and I promised to get back to him after consultations with some members of the group.
I immediately got in touch with one of the members who expressed surprise that I did not leave for the UK. He asked if he could come down to brief me on the plan. We agreed to meet immediately. He arrived barely 15 minutes later. He briefed me that indeed a coup was to take place the next day. Senior officers had been summoned for a briefing on the political situation in the country, in fact, most of them had arrived Lagos already. Some of them, including the GOCs, were going to be placed under arrest at the venue of the meeting, the Airforce officers’ mess at Kofo Abayomi Street, Victoria Island, Lagos. The time fixed was 9am. Gen. Abacha was to take over as Head of State, etc.
The coup plan was based on a very poor appreciation of the situation. It could therefore hardly achieve the aim. I have not been able to ascertain which formations or units were involved in the plot other than those in Lagos, but then a desperate man can take any risk.
A coup against IBB without the support of the GOCs and the reconnaissance battalions would be an exercise in futility. When I pointed out the weakness of the plan, the officer readily agreed and said that he was also not too sure the coup would succeed. But he was persuaded because they had to preempt a coup by another group consisting largely of junior officers of the Gideon Orkar ideological conviction. I needed no further proof. I thanked the officer for his brief and assured him that the coup would be aborted either that very night or soon after it was started the next morning and we parted.
I drove straight to the Flag Staff House Marina. I met the COAS, Gen. Salihu with many visitors, mostly senior officers, who had come for the next day’s meeting. Officers like Aziza, Ayuba and a host of others were waiting to see him. I was not sure what their mission was but I pleaded with them to allow me jump the queue as I had something urgent to discuss with the chief. They agreed, and I went in as soon as the person he was conferring with came out.
He asked me to sit down and apologized that our trip had to be cancelled. He asked whether I was aware of the next day’s meeting since l was supposed to attend as commandant of the armoured corps. I told him that that was why I had come to discuss with him.
Without going into too much detail for obvious reasons, I advised the Chief to meet Gen. Abacha as soon as possible to advise him to call off tomorrow’s meeting on security grounds.
He should also advise IBB of the need for him to take extra care of his personal security over the next 24 hours. In the event that Abacha refused the advice, the Chief should stay away from the meeting and ask his GOCs to stay away also. Of course the Chief wanted to find out what was happening and what informed my advice. I simply told him to believe me that I heard rumours and time was too short to verify. I promised to find out more and brief him later.
I have always enjoyed Gen. Salihu’s confidence and respect. Of course, I have no doubt that Salihu got touch with his Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). But he immediately left for Gen. Abacha’s house. He must have persuaded him to call off the meeting and mercifully averted a bloodbath, which an attempt coup against IBB would have resulted in. I was told later that General Abacha was very mad with Salihu and promised to deal with him at an opportune time. It is very sad that he got that opportunity so soon when the truly professional officer was prematurely retired from service to the detriment of the development of professionalism in the military.
What that fine officer would have contributed to the Nigerian Army is succinctly encapsulated in his sad description of the military as “an Army of anything goes” in his valedictory speech.
As the nation debated IBB’s sincerity to step aside on 27 August, 1993, he decided on a surprise move by leaving a day earlier, as if to confirm that he was truly fed up. The reasons or the forces that were responsible for persuading IBB to annul the June 12 elections may perhaps be known later.
Honestly, I can only guess but even the guess, I will leave for another day.
The ING was inaugurated on 26 July. The president was expected to retire along with all the service Chiefs. It came therefore as great surprise that Gen. Abacha was missing on that list. This fatal decision attracted many theories, one of course being that the ING arrangement was a mere ploy to hand over power to Abacha indirectly.
A clause in the decree that established the ING which provided that in the event of the incapacitation of the Head of that government, the most senior military officer would take over, gave substance to that theory. I am not any wise, but whatever the aim, even Chief Shonekan had misgivings. He protested the decision. I was told later that reluctantly, he accepted to be sworn in on that condition when he was shown security reports, which indicated threats to the ING from a group of some junior and middle ranking officers who were planning to topple it soon as it was inaugurated.
I am still curious to know the source of those false, dubious and self-serving security reports. Things were done in such a hurry that Shonekan did not have much time to reflect on most the decisions, including the appointment of Abacha the ‘Guardian Angel’ to his administration.
In another battle to prevent General Abacha from taking over power, I approached some senior officers to plead with IBB to leave Gen. Salihu as the COAS. My calculation was that with his large following in the Army, he could very well counter Abacha’s predatory moves until we could move against Shonekan’s government and restore Abiola’s mandate. Salihu may also have been averse to military coups, but he would not refuse join in a move to restore the credibility of the military which the removal of the ING and swearing in of winner of the election would achieve. Besides, officer like Gen. Tanko Ayuba had already started working on him.
I honestly don’t know how far they had gone. That was not to be. Salihu was replaced by Gen. Abdulsalam. But curiously enough, Abdulsalam himself was in turn replaced by Gen. Aliyu Mohammed Gusau.
Before I left Abuja for Bauchi after the president’s send-off banquet, Gen. Abacha once again asked me meet him at his guest house in Maitama. I met him; the story was the same. Abiola had to exercise his mandate before this nation could return to normalcy. Abacha had genuine intentions when he asked earlier that he be allowed to take over for six months to sanitize the armed forces and judiciary before handing over Abiola.
He confessed to me that he was already in touch with Abiola and Baba Gana Kingibe and that they were in total agreement with this plan. But now that IBB is gone, the task was easier and required less time. In fact, it could even be achieved under the ING. He had already drawn up a restructuring plan for the armed forces and the judiciary, which he intended to present to Shonekan for ratification. He was going to hold consultations and wanted to see me in a week’s time in Lagos.
Was I convinced of his genuine intentions to hand over to Abiola? I would be a bloody fool to believe, but what could I do but except await my fate and pray that God would intervene?
I returned to Bauchi once again a worried man. I made wider consultations with some of our officers including some of the armoured brigade commanders. Officers like retired Colonels Lucky Torrey, Oloruntoba etc have been persistent in their belief that we could go it alone. But I convinced them of the inherent risk of needless bloodshed and the possibility of igniting the explosion. Rumours of civil uprising were rife. Since the GOCs were probably not aware of our plans, I imagined a situation where Abacha would rally their support on the pretext of protecting the ING against us.
There was absolutely no doubt that the reconnaissance commanders were committed to the de-annulment cause and were more than capable of neutralizing the Division Headquarters but at a potentially great cost. With such a heavy toll, it would have taken and would continue to take perhaps too great a cost to pursue that cause to its logical conclusion.
I met Abacha in the second week of August. He provided me with his restructuring plan for the military; some GOCs and commanders were to be replaced and reshuffled. Of course, I was not affected as far as the paper which I saw went; but to be honest, I was not sure that the list to Shonekan would not include my name.
Incidentally, Gen. Ahmed Abdullahi was present when Gen. Abacha briefed me. One of the persons he planned to have moved was General Dogonyaro. But this would definitely pose some problem. I imagined that IBB would have immediately reacted by asking Shonekan to reject the move and that would scuttle the whole exercise. He had to find a way out.
He therefore came up with an idea that since he was going to address formation commanders and other senior officers, he would want me to draw the attention of the meeting to the lop-sidedness of defence appointment in favour of the North. That it was unfair to have the Minister of Defence, CDS and COAS from the same geographical zone. There was therefore the need for balancing to reflect federal character.
Both Gen. Abdullahi and I agreed, but I disagreed with his suggestion that Gen. Dogonyaro should be replaced by Gen. Diya which he asked me to propose. Instead, I suggested that he should make the sacrifice since he was senior to Dogonyaro. He then asked Ahmed to put forward this proposal, which I understand he later did since I did not even attend that meeting. It was in the course of that meeting that Gen. Ishola Williams, an upright officer, bluntly asked Gen. Abacha to reveal his timetable for takeover and make his intention to go on retirement known. Abacha waved it off as a joke typical of Gen. Williams. He could, however, not hide the embarrassment which it caused him.
While in Lagos, I visited Gen. Diya just to find out what his thinking was. The general was a helpless man. He was very much concerned about his fate as a Yoruba officer being identified as a willing accomplice in a plot that would deprive a fellow Yoruba of his rightful mandate. I had no doubt that he appreciated my perseverance, but he was equally embarrassed by the fact of being appealed to by a Hausa Fulani officer to take a stand against Abacha for the realization of Abiola’s mandate.
He was always ill at ease at my appearance in his house. This time, he confessed to me that he was virtually helpless. Gen. Abacha had convinced him that the military was against Abiola’s mandate. He observed that I had done so much that it was time for me to be a bit more flexible. I got his message and that was when I made the prediction that he was seeking power by riding the tiger and he was going to end up in its stomach.
Some of the members of the original group had also been deceived into believing that Abacha was the solution.
I went back to Bauchi convinced that it was only a matter of time before Abacha kicked out Shonekan. I played my last card by trying to open up a dialogue with the GOCs before they were replaced. I sent Major Lar to GOC I Division to inform him that I would want to see him soon, but before our meeting, he should sleep with an eye open. The idea was to alert him if he was not already aware of the impending threat.
Lar reported back that the senior officer was expecting me. It was however too late because within the next 48 hours, changes had been announced replacing the GOCs.
About two weeks later, I met the new GOC I Division, Major Gen. MC. Alli a very fine professional. I was frank with him when I told him of what we had planned earlier and what I still believed was possible. The general emphatically agreed that de-annulment and swearing in of Abiola was a just cause and that we should not delay.
I felt emboldened to contact the GOC 3 Div., Gen. Olanrewaju who did not look so sure. I couldn’t count on him. Some of the other officers I contacted thought it was a good idea, but would need assurances that they would not end up being retired by the Abiola government. I told them that I could not guarantee that as I was not in contact with Abiola.
As a matter of fact, I only met or spoke with him once. But I would be surprised if MKO would want to reward them with retirement. I had been told he was such a generous and magnanimous personality.
My Arrest, Detention and Retirement
Towards the end of September 1993, I was summoned to AHQ by the new COAS, Gen. Aliyu Gusau. As soon as I entered the Chief’s office, I sensed that some thing was amiss. Gen. Aliyu wore an unusually stern look. He did not even ask me to sit down when he went straight to the point. He said to me: “Dangiwa, you are my junior brother, I have always taken you into confidence and I am now your Chief. You had been plotting a coup for some time now and you did not tell me. Why? The Minister of Defence has even shown me the coup speech you prepared for him.” How could one start answering such a question?
I retorted by asking since he was not part of the plot, how did he expect me to inform him? I refused to deny anything but I told him that his source, the Minister of Defence, Gen. Sani Abacha was my co-conspirator. He said: “Very well, the DMI (who was then Gen. Ahmed Abdullahi) was outside. Let him take your statement.” I saluted and left. By the entrance was Gen. Ahmed Abdullahi dressed in camouflage uniform. He was with some officers and men of his directorate similarly dressed. The soldiers bore rifles.
I was led into an adjacent room where Ahmed issued me a paper and instructed me to write my statement. I asked on what subject. He said the coup they are talking about. I told Ahmed that in that case, I did not need to write any statement because both the minister and he were fully conversant with the subject and should be able to brief the COAS better. Ahmed told me that he was instructed to take me to Kirikiri after I must have finished writing my statement. He told me also that some reconnaissance battalion commanders had been arrested and brought to Lagos.
I was mad. I felt betrayed. How could anybody think of arresting these principal officers who were only ready to selflessly serve the cause of justice? I pleaded with Ahmed to please help in setting them free. I promised I would take responsibility. Gen. Ahmed was most sympathetic and promised to ensure their safety. But he was simply carrying out his orders clearly against his wish. I have said it earlier that he was pro-de-annulment even if he changed later.
The news of my arrest spread so fast throughout AHQ. Many officers rushed to the Chief’s office to confirm. Those of them who were involved decided to meet Gen. Aliyu. They were led by Gen. Tanko Ayuba and the Chief’s Military Assistant, Col. Jaafara Isa.These officers proved to be the men of great honour and moral courage. They briefed the Chief on the genesis of our struggle and its aim. They confessed that they were also involved as Gen. Abacha and a host of others were. They intimated him of their willingness to give themselves up instead of watching me made a scapegoat.
The general was shocked and near tears when they narrated their story. He called me back and told me that he had been briefed by some officers on my case. He ordered that I stay with the DMI.
. First published in Richard Akinnola’s books – My Story of June 12, and Fellow Nigerians
