Judicial Independence and Financial Autonomy: A Critical Response to Enugu Digital Court Project

By Sylvester Udemezue

I recently came across a news report titled “‘Judicial Independence Must Be Effective, Not Just Formal’ — Gov. Mbah Commissions Enugu Digital Court Facility,” in which it was reported that the Governor of Enugu State, His Excellency Peter Mbah, commissioned a newly built digital court facility. The project was presented as a major step toward modernising the judiciary and enhancing speedy justice delivery. According to the report, the Governor emphasised that judicial independence must be substantive rather than merely formal, highlighting technological integration and financial autonomy as critical to achieving this goal. The facility reportedly comprises several digitally equipped courtrooms intended to decongest courts and improve efficiency, while the Chief Judge of Enugu State expressed appreciation to the Governor for his support of judicial reforms.

While the initiative may appear commendable at first glance, the report raises fundamental and unsettling questions about the true meaning and practical reality of judicial independence in Nigeria.

1. First, why is the Enugu State Judiciary unable to build a digital court facility for itself? Why must such an essential judicial infrastructure project originate from, and be executed by, the Executive arm of government?
2. Second, why must the Governor personally “commission” a judicial facility? Why could the Chief Judge of Enugu State (who constitutionally heads the judiciary in the state) not be the one to initiate, complete, and, if necessary, commission such a project? Indeed, must a judicial facility await ceremonial commissioning by the Executive before it can be put to use, or would the heavens fall if the courts simply commenced operations once the facility was completed?

These questions go to the heart of the matter. Against this background, one must ask whether the Governor was truly serious when he declared that judicial independence and financial autonomy must be effective and not merely formal. With due respect, it is difficult to reconcile that statement with the reality it seeks to describe. A judiciary that depends on the Executive for court buildings, digital infrastructure, judges’ residences, official vehicles, and even basic operational facilities cannot, by any meaningful standard, be said to be independent. Financial dependence inevitably breeds institutional vulnerability. In this context, the age-old principle remains relevant: he who pays the piper dictates the tune. Judicial independence cannot thrive where the Executive plays the role of benefactor and provider for the judiciary. The contradiction is stark and unavoidable.

There is absolutely no reason why the judiciary should not have comprehensive annual budgetary provisions covering all its recurrent, operational and capital needs. Judicial leaders, like their counterparts in the Executive and the Legislature, should prepare and submit their budget proposals for inclusion in the annual appropriation process and thereafter appear before the appropriate legislative bodies to defend those budgets. Once duly passed and signed into law, funds should be released directly to the judiciary from the appropriate pool accounts (whether the Federation Account or the relevant state accounts) enabling the judiciary to independently procure what it needs, including court infrastructure, digital facilities, housing for judicial officers, vehicles, ICT systems, and other logistical and institutional upgrades. There is no justification for the Executive to continue procuring facilities and amenities for the judiciary as though the judiciary were a department or agency under executive control.

As a constitutionally recognised and co-equal arm of government, the judiciary ought to function independently, just as the Executive and the Legislature function independently of one another.

Notably, it is difficult to recall any instance where judges or legislators purchase or donate houses, vehicles, or facilities to the Executive arm of government. This is so only because the Executive is already self-sustaining, having made adequate budgetary provisions for itself in the annual budget. The judiciary must likewise be self-sustaining if it is to secure and safeguard its independence. If, across all levels and jurisdictions in Nigeria, the leadership of the judiciary cannot from its own budget procure vehicles for judges and magistrates, cannot provide critical facilities for itself, and cannot even construct official quarters for its own staff, then some troubling questions arise:

1. What has become of the judiciary’s official budget as an independent arm of government?
2. Are there no appropriations for capital projects such as residential housing for judges, development of digital court facilities, vehicles and other critical infrastructure?
3. Or has the Nigerian judiciary ceased to function as the third and independent arm of government and instead become an appendage of the Executive, so much so that the Executive now builds houses and is responsible for installing other facilities for judges or for the Judiciary?
4. Has the judiciary become so emasculated and constrained that its leaders are either unwilling or unable to demand, defend, and secure adequate financial provisions for essential capital projects through the judiciary’s own annual budgetary process?

Until these questions are honestly confronted and structurally resolved, declarations about “effective judicial independence” will remain aspirational rhetoric rather than lived institutional reality.

Udemezue (udems) is a Law Teacher and can be reached at lawmentorng@gmail.com.